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Abstract 
This paper provides a unified approach to study the influence of uncertainty and 
spillovers on the direction of R&D policy when firms engage in international R&D 
competition. When the reward to the winner is exogenously given, it is shown that 
whether a government will tax or subsidize its firm is sensitive to the type of uncertainty 
that characterizes the R&D process. When the reward to the winner is endogenously 
determined by R&D spending, the direction of optimal policy is not only sensitive to the 
type of uncertainty, but also sensitive to the degree of spillovers. 
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1. Introduction 
Two key features of R&D are uncertainty and spillovers. Uncertainty in R&D has 
been well recognized in the literature. Examples include Bagwell and Staiger (1992, 
1994). In their empirical study, Coe and Helpman (1995), Keller (2004), and Park (2004) 
found that international R&D spillovers were significant. In this paper, a unified 
approach is provided to study the influence of uncertainty and spillovers on R&D policy 
when firms engage in international R&D competition. We show that both uncertainty and 
spillovers are important in affecting the direction of optimal policy. In this paper, 
domestic firms compete with foreign firms in product innovation. Governments make 
policy announcements before firms choose their R&D spending. A firm’s R&D output is 
affected by uncertainty and the spillovers from its rivals. When the reward to the winner 
of the R&D competition is exogenously given, optimal policy is sensitive to the type of 
uncertainty that characterizes the R&D process. Depending on the type of uncertainty, the 
optimal policy can be subsidizing its firm, laissez-faire, or taxing its firm. The reason 
behind the above result is that different types of uncertainties lead to different types of 
reaction functions. Depending on the form of uncertainty, the foreign firm’s R&D 
spending may decrease, remain the same, or increase with an increase in the domestic 
firm’s R&D spending. As a result, the optimal policy depends on the form of uncertainty.  
When the reward to the winner of R&D competition is endogenously determined 
by R&D spending, the direction of optimal policy is shown to be sensitive to the degree 
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of spillovers. The intuition is the following. Optimal policy depends on whether an 
increase in the foreign firm’s R&D spending decreases or increases the domestic firm’s 
expected profit. An increase in the foreign firm’s R&D spending has two effects on the 
domestic firm’s expected profit. First, it decreases the domestic firm’s probability of 
winning. This effect decreases the domestic firm’s expected profit. Second, the total 
amount of spillovers to the domestic firm increases and the domestic firm’s R&D output 
increases. Since the reward to the winner is its R&D output, an increase in the foreign 
firm’s R&D spending increases the domestic firm’s reward if the domestic firm wins. 
The latter effect increases the domestic firm’s expected profit. When the degree of 
spillovers is small, the first effect dominates and an increase in the foreign firm’s R&D 
spending decreases the domestic firm’s expected profit. When the degree of spillovers is 
large, the second effect dominates and an increase in the foreign firm’s R&D increases 
the domestic firm’s expected profit. Thus, optimal policy when the degree of spillovers is 
small may be opposite to the optimal policy when the degree of spillovers is large.  
In a seminal paper, Spencer and Brander (1983) studied the situation that a 
domestic firm engaged in Cournot competition with a foreign firm. They showed that the 
domestic government could increase national welfare by announcing a subsidy plan for 
the domestic firm before firms chose their R&D spending.
1
 While Spencer and Brander 
(1983) did not take uncertainty in R&D into account, Bagwell and Staiger (1992, 1994) 
introduced uncertainty into international R&D competition. They showed that the optimal 
policy might be sensitive to whether R&D spending changed the mean or risk of a firm’s 
production cost. Bagwell and Staiger (1992, 1994) did not take spillovers in R&D into 
account. In Muniagurria and Singh (1997), Leahy and Neary (1999), and DeCourcy 
(2005), a firm’s R&D output might be affected by spillovers from its rivals. However, 
they did not take uncertainty in R&D into consideration. Miyagiwa and Ohno (1997) 
studied a model in which the degree of appropriability is measured by the length of 
patent. There are two differences between their paper and this one. First, they restrict 
random variables to be exponentially distributed, as in the paten race literature. Second, 
in their paper, when the patent length is zero (low appropriability), each of the two firms 
gets a duopoly profit. In this model, even if there is full spillover, the winner of R&D 
                                            
1
 See Brander (1995) for a survey of the literature on strategic trade theory. 
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competition still gets the monopoly profit. Employing the all-pay auction approach, 
Konard (2000) studied contests between domestic and foreign firms. His paper is 
different from this model as a firm’s effort leads to deterministic outcome in his model. 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic 
model. The domestic government chooses policy optimally in the first stage to maximize 
domestic national welfare and firms choose R&D spending in the second stage to 
maximize expected profit. In Section 3, a symmetric equilibrium where governments 
choose optimal policies simultaneously is studied. Section 4 studies optimal policy when 
the reward to the winner is endogenously determined by R&D spending. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
There are one domestic firm and one foreign firm. They compete in developing a 
new product by spending on R&D. It is assumed that the new product will be exported to 
a third country for consumption. There is neither domestic consumption nor foreign 
consumption of this good. The game has two stages. In the first stage, the domestic 
government announces a tax or subsidy rate for the domestic firm’s R&D spending. It is 
assumed that the domestic government can commit to its tax or subsidy schedule. In the 
second stage, both the domestic and the foreign firms choose R&D spending 
simultaneously. In this section, the foreign government is not active in choosing its tax or 
subsidy rate. The case that both the domestic and foreign governments choose policies 
simultaneously is studied in Section 3. 
A firm’s R&D output is specified as the sum of its own R&D input, spillover 
from its rival, and a random effect. The realized R&D output iq  of the domestic firm is 
defined by the following equation 
    ijiiq   .           (1) 
In equation (1), i  denotes the domestic firm’s R&D input and j  denotes the 
foreign firm’s R&D input. The spillover rate   is exogenously given and satisfies 
10   . The influence of uncertainty is represented by the random variable i . This 
approach of modeling uncertainty is different from Bagwell and Staiger (1992, 1994). In 
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their model, R&D spending alters the density function of realized production cost. In this 
model, R&D spending will shift the entire density function without changing the shape of 
the density function. 
The approach of modeling R&D output here is related to the literature on labor 
tournaments and R&D spillovers. First, without the spillover effect, equation (1) is 
similar to the formula used in the literature on labor tournaments, see Lazear and Rosen 
(1981) for an example. Second, without the uncertainty effect, (1) is similar to the 
literature on R&D spillovers, see d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) for an example. 
Zhou (2006) has a more detailed illustration of this R&D output function. 
R&D tournaments are frequently observed in reality. For example, Super Efficient 
Refrigerator Program Inc., a coalition of 25 private and public electric utilities, offered 30 
million dollars for the developer of a refrigerator that could save energy significantly 
over current models. Frigidaire Co. and Whirlpool Corp. were selected as the two 
finalists from 14 contestants to compete for this reward (The Washington Post, December 
20, 1992). Whirlpool won this contest. In this example, firms competed to produce the 
best innovation on a specific date, rather than to discover a new product of a given 
quality. 
Let j  denote a random variable. The foreign firm’s R&D output is defined by 
jijjq   . It is assumed that i  and j  are identically and independently 
distributed. Let the distribution function of these random variables be denoted by F , 
which is assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable. The corresponding density 
function is denoted by f . The firm that produces the higher output wins the contest. The 
winner of the competition gets a fixed reward of 1W  and the loser gets a fixed payoff of 
2W , 21 WW  . If the winner of the R&D competition gets perfect patent protection for its 
product, 2W  may be zero. When patent protection is not perfect, 2W  may be positive. 
The game is solved by backward induction. The second stage is studied first.  
 
2.1. The Second Stage 
In the second stage, firms engage in R&D competition. For the domestic firm to 
win, it must be sure that 
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 iji  jij   .    
The above inequality is equivalent to 
   jiji   ))(1( . 
 Given the R&D spending of its rival, the domestic firm’s probability of winning 
the contest is ]))(1[( ijiF    for a given i . Integrating over all possible 
realization of i , the domestic firm’s expected probability of winning the contest is 
iiiji dfF  )(]))(1[( 


.  
The domestic government may choose a tax or subsidy on the domestic firm’s 
R&D spending in the first stage. Let the tax or subsidy rate chosen by the domestic 
government be denoted by it , 11  it . When it  is positive (negative), it is a subsidy 
(tax). Let )( iC   denote the cost function for the domestic firm. It is assumed that 0'C  
and 0'' C . With the tax or subsidy, the domestic firm’s net R&D cost is )()1( ii Ct  .  
The domestic firm’s expected profit is 
iiijii dfFW  )(]))(1[(1  


 
       ))(]))(1[(1(2 iiiji dfFW   


)()1( ii Ct   
iiiji dfFWW  )(]))(1[()( 21  


+ 2W )()1( ii Ct  .   (2) 
The domestic firm chooses i  to maximize its expected payoff (2). Assuming the 
existence of an interior solution, the first order condition for profit maximization is 
     iiiji
i
i dffWW
d
d


)(]))(1[()1)(( 21 




0)(')1(  ii Ct  .    (3a) 
It is assumed that the second order condition for the domestic firm’s profit maximization 
is satisfied.
2
 
From (3a), the response of the domestic firm to a change of the foreign firm’s 
R&D spending is given by 
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 For example, when 5.11 W , 02 W , 1k , 0 , and 1)( f  for ]5.0,5.0[ , the second order 
condition for profit maximization is satisfied. 
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 .           (4) 
From the second order condition for the domestic firm’s profit maximization, 
0/ 22  ii  . From (4), the sign of ji   /  depends on the sign of 'f . When 0'f
, 0/  ji   and the reaction function has a negative slope; when 0'f , 0/  ji   
and the reaction function has a slope of zero; when 0'f , 0/  ji   and the reaction 
function has a positive slope. Using the terminology of Bulow et al. (1985), when 0'f  
( 0'f ), the domestic firm and the foreign firm’s R&D spending are strategic substitutes 
(strategic complements). Similar to their study, whether firms’ R&D spending are 
strategic substitutes or complements is sensitive to the shape of the density function. 
Here the density function is required to be globally monotonic. There are some 
distribution functions satisfying this requirement. For example, the power function 
distribution satisfies 0'f ; the uniform distribution satisfies 0'f ; and the exponential 
distribution satisfies 0'f . One interpretation of f  is that it measures technological 
opportunities of an industry. A positive density function may indicate an industry rich in 
technological opportunities and a negative density function may indicate an industry 
lacking technological opportunities. Levin and Reiss (1988) provided a detailed study 
about the importance of technological opportunities in affecting firms’ R&D spending. 
The foreign firm has the same cost function as the domestic firm. Its expected 
profit j  is jjjij dfFWW  )(]))(1[()( 21  


+ 2W )( jC  . The first order 
condition for the foreign firm’s profit maximization is 
jjjij dffWW  )(]))(1[()1)(( 21  


0)('  jC  .     (3b) 
It is assumed that the second order condition for the foreign firm’s profit maximization is 
satisfied. 
 
2.2. The First Stage 
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In this subsection, the domestic government’s optimal decision in the first stage is 
studied. Anticipating firms’ R&D spending in the second stage, the domestic government 
chooses taxes or subsidies optimally in the first stage. The domestic government’s 
objective is to maximize national welfare. It is assumed that the domestic government 
puts equal weight on the domestic firm’s profit and its tax revenue (or subsidy spending). 
As there is no domestic consumption of the new product, national welfare for the 
domestic country is  
iiji fdFWWS  ]))(1[()( 21  


+
2W )()1( ii Ct  )( iiCt   
         = iiji fdFWW  ]))(1[()( 21  


+ 2W )( iC  . 
The first order condition for domestic social welfare maximization is 

idt
dS
i
i
iiiiji
dt
d
CdffWW

 )}(')(]))(1[()1)({( 21  


 
  
i
j
iiiji
dt
d
dffWW

 )(]))(1[()1)(( 21  


.       (5) 
From (3a), it can be shown that 
iiiji dffWW  )(]))(1[()1)(( 21  


)(')1( ii Ct  . 
Substituting the above equation into (5) yields 

idt
dS
i
j
ii
i
i
ii
dt
d
Ct
dt
d
Ct



 )(')1()('  .         (6) 
Setting (6) equal to zero, optimal tax or subsidy rate is given by 
   
i
i
i
j
i
i
dt
d
dt
d
t
t 

1
.          (7) 
Total differentiation of (3a) leads to 
iiiiiji dCtfdfWW  )]('')1(]))(1[(')1)([(
2
21  


 
dtCdfdfWW ijiiji )(']))(1[(')1)((
2
21   


.  (8a) 
Total differentiation of (3b) leads to 
ijjij dfdfWW  ]))(1[(')1)((
2
21  


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     0)]('']))(1[(')1)([( 221  


jjjjij dCfdfWW  .   (8b) 
Let   denote the determinant of the 22  Jacobian matrix of (8). For stability, it  
is assumed that   is positive. From (8), how i  and j  change with it  is given by 
       






)]('']))(1[(')1)()[((' 221 jjjiji
i
i
CfdfWWC
dt
d 
,    (9a) 
       






jjiji
i
j
fdfWWC
dt
d  ]))(1[(')1)()(('
2
21
.       (9b) 
From (9a), a subsidy (tax) by the domestic government on R&D spending will 
increase (decrease) the domestic firm’s R&D spending. Plugging (9) into (7) yields 

 i
i
t
t
1 







)}('']))(1[(')1)({(
]))(1[(')1)((
2
21
2
21
jjjij
jjij
CfdfWW
fdfWW


.      (10) 
From (10), the optimal tax or subsidy is 
  it
)(''
]))(1[(')1)(( 221
j
jjij
C
fdfWW

 



.       (11) 
 The following proposition shows that optimal R&D policy is sensitive to the type 
of uncertainty that characterizes the R&D process. It shows that the domestic government 
is more likely to subsidize R&D spending in an industry richer in technological 
opportunities. 
 
 Proposition 1. When reward to the winner of R&D competition is exogenously 
given, a sufficient condition for the domestic government to tax the domestic firm is that 
0'f ; a sufficient condition for the domestic government to be laissez-faire is that 
0'f ; a sufficient condition for the domestic government to subsidize the domestic firm 
is that 0'f . 
 Proof: Since 0)('' jC  , from (11), the sign of it  is the same as the sign of 'f . 
           Q.E.D. 
 The intuition behind Proposition 1 is the following. In general, the direction of 
optimal policy depends on the slope of the reaction function. From (4), there are three 
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cases. First, when 0'f , a decrease in the domestic firm’s R&D spending leads to a 
decrease in the foreign firm’s R&D spending. As the two firms’ R&D spending are 
strategic complements, the domestic government’s optimal policy is to tax the domestic 
firm. Second, when 0'f , a change in the domestic firm’s R&D spending will not 
change the foreign firm’s R&D spending. As there is no strategic role for the domestic 
government to play, the optimal policy is laissez-faire. Finally, when 0'f , an increase 
in the domestic firm’s R&D spending leads to a decrease in the foreign firm’s R&D 
spending. As firms’ R&D spending are strategic substitutes, the domestic government’s 
optimal policy is to subsidize the domestic firm. 
What is the impact of the domestic government’s intervention on the foreign 
firm’s expected profit? Depending on the sign of 'f , there are three possibilities. First, 
for 0'f , when the domestic government taxes the domestic firm, the domestic firm’s 
R&D spending decreases. The foreign firm will also decrease R&D spending and its 
expected profit increases. Second, when 0'f , the foreign firm’s expected profit is not 
affected by domestic government. Finally, for 0'f , when the domestic government 
subsidizes the domestic firm, the domestic firm’s R&D spending increases. The foreign 
firm’s R&D spending decreases and its expected profit decreases. 
 From (11), it is clear that the optimal subsidy or tax increases with the prize 
spread 21 WW  .  
 
3. Symmetric Equilibrium 
In Section 2, only the domestic government is active in choosing its industrial 
policy. In this section, the foreign government may also choose its subsidy or tax to the 
foreign firm to maximize the foreign country’s welfare. The Nash equilibrium that the 
domestic and foreign governments choose taxes or subsidies simultaneously in the first 
stage is studied. Let the foreign government’s tax or subsidy rate to the foreign firm’s 
R&D spending be denoted by jt . A Nash equilibrium in policies is a pair of tax or 
subsidy rates ),( ji tt such that it  maximizes the domestic country’s welfare, given jt . At 
the same time, jt  maximizes the foreign country’s welfare, given it . In a symmetric 
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equilibrium, governments choose the same level of tax or subsidy rate in the first stage 
and firms choose the same level of R&D spending in the second stage. 
 With the introduction of the foreign tax or subsidy, equation (3a) will not change. 
Equation (3b) changes to 
jjjij dffWW  )(]))(1[()1)(( 21  


0)(')1(  jj Ct  .     (3b’) 
Equation (10) changes to 
    
 i
i
t
t
1 







)}('')1(]))(1[(')1)({(
]))(1[(')1)((
2
21
2
21
jjjjij
jjij
CtfdfWW
fdfWW


. 
In a symmetric equilibrium, ttt ji   and ji   . Thus, the above equation reduces to 

 t
t
1 







)}('')1(')1)({(
')1)((
2
21
2
21
jj
j
CtfdfWW
fdfWW


.      (10’) 
 Let Uf  ( Lf ) denote the value of the density function at the least upper bound (the 
highest lower bound) of its support. The following proposition characterizes optimal 
policy in a symmetric equilibrium.
3
  
 
Proposition 2. In a symmetric equilibrium, a necessary and sufficient condition 
for a government to tax its firm is that LU ff  ; a necessary and sufficient condition for 
                                            
3 The situation that governments choose reward to their firms optimally to maximize national welfare is 
similar. Let iW  denote the reward chosen by the domestic government for the domestic firm. If the 
domestic firm loses the R&D competition, its reward is 2W . The foreign government may also choose a 
reward jW  simultaneously for the foreign firm. The domestic firm maximizes its expected profit 
iiijii dfFWW  )(]))(1[()( 2  


+ 2W )( iC  . Equation (10’) changes to 



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







})(')1)({(
)(')1)((
2
2
2
2
kfdfWW
fdfWW
jjj
jjj


. From this equation, whether 
21
21
WW
WWi


  is smaller, equal to, 
or less than 1 depends on the sign of the nominator of the right side of this equation. For LU ff  ; 
1WWi  ; for LU ff  , 1WWi  ; and for LU ff  , 1WWi  . Thus, for a given optimal tax or subsidy rate 
to R&D spending, an equivalent optimal reward can be found. For a given optimal reward, an equivalent 
optimal R&D tax or subsidy rate can be found. 
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a government to be laissez-faire is that LU ff  ; a necessary and sufficient condition for 
a government to subsidize its firm is that LU ff  . 
Proof: The sign of the left side of (10’) is the same as the sign of t  since t1  is 
always larger than zero. From the second order condition of the foreign firm’s profit 
maximization, the denominator of the right side of (10’) is negative. Thus, the sign of the 
right side of (10) is the same as the sign of jfdf '


. As a result, the sign of it  is the 
same as the sign of jfdf '


. Integrating by parts, it can be shown that 
)(
2
1
' 22 LU fffdf 


 . Therefore, 0it  if and only if LU ff  ; 0it  if and only if 
LU ff  ; 0it  if and only if LU ff  .      Q.E.D. 
 
A special case of LU ff   is that 0'f  globally and 0'f  is a special case of 
LU ff  . Similarly, 0'f  globally is a special case of LU ff  .  
From Proposition 2, when random variables are symmetrically distributed, the 
optimal R&D policy is laissez-faire. Some examples of symmetric distribution functions 
include the normal distribution and the uniform distribution. From Proposition 2, the 
direction of the optimal policy is unaffected by the possible presence of foreign tax or 
subsidy. Thus, the domestic government will subsidize or tax the domestic firm’s R&D 
spending no matter the foreign government subsidizes or taxes the foreign firm or not. 
 Bagwell and Staiger (1992, 1994) and Miyagiwa and Ohno (1997) studied the 
domestic government’s local incentives to tax or subsidize the domestic firm when the 
initial tax or subsidy rate was zero. Here, the global incentive for the domestic 
government to tax or subsidize R&D spending is established. 
 From this point and on, let the cost function take the quadratic form, 
    2
2
)( ii
k
C   ,           (12) 
where k  is a positive constant. 
In a symmetric equilibrium, ttt ji  . In addition, ji   . From (10’) and (12), 
optimal tax or subsidy rate is given by 
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  
 t
t
1 







])1(')1)([(
')1)((
2
21
2
21
ktfdfWW
fdfWW


.                (13) 
Equation (13) is equivalent to 
    tt 2 0
')1)(( 221

 


k
fdfWW 
.            (14) 
 Solving (14) for t  leads to two roots. The larger root is discarded because it 
implies that the response from the foreign firm when the domestic country imposes a tax 
or subsidy on the domestic firm will be larger than the response from the domestic firm. 
That will not be stable. The smaller root is kept, which is 
   
2
')()1(4
11
21
2
k
fdfWW
t







.        (15) 
 The following proposition studies the relationship between the optimal tax or 
subsidy rate and the degree of spillovers. 
  
 Proposition 3: When taxes or subsidies are chosen optimally in a symmetric 
equilibrium, 0
d
dt
 if and only if LU ff  ; 0
d
dt
 if and only if LU ff  ; 0
d
dt
 if 
and only if LU ff  . 
 Proof: Differentiation of (15) with respect to   yields 












fdfWWkk
fdfWW
d
dt
')()1(4
'))(1(2
21
2
21
.        (16) 
From (16), the sign of ddt /  is the same as the sign of jfdf '


, which equals 
)(
2
1 22
LU ff  .           Q.E.D. 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 3 is the following. From Proposition 2, there are 
three cases. First, when LU ff  , the domestic government wants to discourage the 
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domestic firm to spend on R&D. A higher spillover rate decreases a firm’s incentive to 
spend on R&D. As a result, the tax rate decreases with the degree of spillovers as the 
need to discourage a firm’s incentive to spend on R&D decreases. Second, when LU ff 
, the optimal policy for the domestic government is laissez-faire as there is no strategic 
benefit from intervention. No matter what is the degree of spillovers, 0it . As a result, 
0/ ddt . Finally, when LU ff  , the domestic government wants to encourage the 
domestic firm to spend on R&D. A higher spillover rate decreases a firm’s incentive to 
spend on R&D. To compensate the effect from spillovers, the subsidy rate increases with 
the degree of spillovers.  
 When a country begins to be integrated into the world economy, one policy issue 
is the international enforcement of intellectual property rights. This will affect the degree 
of spillovers. For industries with LU ff  , a government may want to enforce property 
rights stricter so that the degree of spillovers is smaller and the need for subsidy is lower. 
For industries with LU ff  , a government may want to enforce property rights looser so 
that the degree of spillovers is higher and the need for tax is lower (a higher tax may lead 
to other types of distortions not considered here). 
When governments choose taxes or subsidies to maximize national welfare, the 
joint welfare of the domestic country and the foreign country usually is not maximized. 
To maximize the joint welfare, governments should tax firms so that there is no R&D 
spending. The reason is that the rewards to the winner and loser are fixed and firms’ 
R&D spending only dissipates the rents. 
 
4. Endogenous Reward to the Winner 
In the above sections, the reward to the winner is exogenously given. In real 
world situations, reward to the winner may be a function of its R&D output. In this 
section, international R&D competition when the reward to the winner is endogenously 
determined by R&D spending is studied.  
The game has two stages. In the first stage, governments make policy 
announcements simultaneously. In the second stage, firms choose their R&D spending 
simultaneously. If a firm’s R&D output is higher than the other one, its reward is its R&D 
 13 
output. Otherwise, its reward is zero. Thus, a higher R&D spending will not only increase 
a firm’s probability of winning, but also increase the reward to winning. 
 The domestic firm’s expected profit is 
2/)1()(]))(1[()( 2iiiiijiijii ktdfF   


.     (17) 
The first order condition for the domestic firm’s profit maximization is4  
      iiiji dfF  )(]))(1[( 


 
iiijiiji dff  )(]))(1[()()1(  


0)1(  ii kt  . (18) 
Define 
iijiijie fdfD  ]))(1[(')(  


 
 fdf iji ]))(1[(  


.       (19) 
The sign of eD  affects the slope of the reaction function. eD  measures the change in the 
domestic firm’s marginal profitability when the foreign firm increases its R&D spending. 
As the reward to the winner increases with R&D spending, when a firm increases its 
R&D spending, the marginal benefit to the firm contains two parts. First, it increases a 
firm’s probability of winning. The change of this effect is measured by the first term on 
the right-hand side of (19). Second, the reward to the winner will also increase. The 
change of the second effect is measured by the second term on the right-hand side of 
(19). 
From (19), it can be shown that 
i
j




e
ii
D2
22
)1(
/




 .                         (20) 
The foreign firm’s expected profit is  
jjjijjij dfF  )(]))(1[()( 


2/)1( 2jj kt  .  
Its first order condition for profit maximization is 
jjjij dfF  )(]))(1[( 


 
                                            
4
It is assumed that the second order condition for profit maximization is satisfied. For example, when 
5.0k  and 6/1)( f for ]3,3[ , the second order condition is satisfied. 
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jjjijjij dff  )(]))(1[()()1(  


0)1(  jj kt  . 
Total differentiation of the first order condition for the domestic firm and the 
foreign firm yields 

i
i
dt
d
e
jjik

  22 /
,               (21a) 

i
j
dt
d
e
ei Dk

  2)1(
.         (21b) 
where e is the determinant of the 22  Jacobian matrix. 
The domestic government will choose taxes or subsidies optimally to maximize 
domestic national welfare, which is 
2/)(]))(1[()( 2iiiijiiji kdfF  


.      (22) 
Taking first order condition with respect to it  yields 
   0])1[( 



i
j
j
i
i
i
iii
dt
d
dt
d
kkt



 .   
The above equation is equivalent to 
it
j
i
ik  
1
ii
ij
dtd
dtd
/
/


.         (23) 
Plugging (21) into (23) yields 
it
j
i
ik  
1
)/( 22 jj
eD

.            (24)  
How does the domestic firm’s profit change with the foreign firm’s R&D 
spending? From (17), it can be shown that 
j
i


iiijiiji dff  )(]))(1[()()1(  


   
    iiiji dfF  )(]))(1[(  


.          (25) 
The interpretation of (25) is the following. An increase in the foreign firm’s R&D 
spending has two effects on the domestic firm’s expected profit. First, it decreases the 
domestic firm’s probability of winning. This is the first term on the right-hand side of 
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(25). Second, it increases the domestic firm’s reward if the domestic firm wins as the 
reward to the winner is its R&D output. This is the second term on the right side of (25). 
From (25), the sign of ji  /  depends on the degree of spillovers. When   is close to 
zero, the first term on the right-hand side of (25) is negative and the second term is close 
to zero. The first effect dominates the second one and an increase in foreign firm’s R&D 
spending decreases the domestic firm’s expected profit. When   is close to 1, the first 
term on the right-hand side of (25) is close to zero and the second term is positive. The 
second effect dominates and an increase in the foreign firm’s R&D spending will 
increase domestic firm’s expected profit. 
The following proposition studies optimal R&D policy when the reward to the 
winner is endogenously determined by R&D spending. It shows that optimal policy is not 
only sensitive to the type of uncertainty, but also sensitive to the degree of spillovers. 
 
 Proposition 4. For 0/  ji  , the optimal policy for the domestic government 
is to tax the domestic firm when 0eD ; the optimal policy for the domestic government 
is laissez-faire when 0eD ; the optimal policy for the domestic government is to 
subsidize the domestic firm when 0eD . 
For 0/  ji  , the optimal policy for the domestic government is to subsidize 
the domestic firm when 0eD ; the optimal policy for the domestic government is 
laissez-faire when 0eD ; the optimal policy for the domestic government is to tax the 
domestic firm when 0eD . 
 Proof: From the second order condition for the foreign firm’s profit maximization, 
0/ 22  jj  . From (24), the sign of t  depends on both the sign of ji  /  and eD . 
           Q.E.D. 
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is the following. In general, optimal policy 
depends on both whether a higher R&D spending makes the domestic firm “tough” or 
“soft” and the slope of the reaction function.5 For 0/  ji  , a higher R&D spending 
                                            
5
 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) for additional illustration. 
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makes the domestic firm tough.  From (20), the slope of the reaction curve depends on 
the sign of eD . There are three situations. First, when eD  is positive, the reaction curve 
has a negative slope and the domestic government’s optimal policy is to subsidize the 
domestic firm. Second, when eD  is equal to zero, the reaction curve has a slope of zero 
and the optimal policy is laissez-faire. Finally, when eD  is negative, the reaction curve 
has a positive slope and the domestic government’s optimal policy is to tax the domestic 
firm. For 0/  ji  , higher R&D spending makes the domestic firm soft and optimal 
policy is reversed. For 0/  ji  , in the special case that random variables are 
uniformly distributed, Proposition 4 shows that the domestic government has an incentive 
to subsidize the domestic firm. 
What is the impact of domestic government’s intervention on the foreign firm’s 
expected profit when the reward to the winner is endogenously determined by R&D 
spending? From 
i
i
i
j
i
j
dt
d
d
d
dt
d 




, the sign of ij dtd /  depends on the spillover rate. 
When   is small, 0/  ij dd   and 0/  ij dtd . When the degree of spillovers is 
large, 0/  ij dd   and 0/  ij dtd . Depending on the degree of spillovers and 
whether the domestic government subsidizes or taxes the domestic firm, there are four 
cases. First, when degree of spillovers is small and the domestic government taxes the 
domestic firm, the foreign firm’s expected profit increases. Second, when degree of 
spillovers is small and the domestic government subsidizes the domestic firm, the foreign 
firm’s expected profit decreases. Third, when degree of spillovers is large and the 
domestic government taxes the domestic firm, the foreign firm’s expected profit 
decreases. Finally, when degree of spillovers is large and the domestic government 
subsidizes the domestic firm, the foreign firm’s expected profit increases. 
 In the above sections, it is assumed that there is no domestic consumption of the 
new product. When there is domestic consumption of this good, domestic government 
may have an incentive to provide output subsidy to the domestic firm as firms ignore 
consumer surplus when making their output choices. 
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In the above sections, there are only one domestic firm and one foreign firm. 
Compared to the situation when there is only one domestic firm, having more than one 
domestic firms generates one additional effect. Now there are negative externalities 
among domestic firms as increasing R&D spending by one domestic firm will decrease 
other domestic firms’ probability of winning. Depending on the slope of the reaction 
function, there are three cases. First, when the reaction function has a negative slope, the 
domestic government wants to encourage the domestic firm to spend on R&D when there 
is only one domestic firm. With the existence of the negative externality, the incentive to 
subsidize the domestic firm is smaller when there are multiple firms. Second, when the 
reaction function has a slope of zero, though there is no strategic benefit from 
intervention, the domestic government will tax domestic firms because of the existence of 
the negative externality. Finally, when there is only one domestic firm and the reaction 
function has a positive slope, the domestic government wants to discourage the domestic 
firm to spend on R&D. This incentive works in the same direction as the negative 
externality when there are multiple firms. As a result, the domestic government will tax 
domestic firms. 
For a country in autarky, when there are several firms conducting R&D in this 
country, the domestic government may be strict in enforcing antitrust policies to prevent 
collusion among these firms. When this country begins to be integrated into the world 
economy and there are some firms in the foreign country conducting R&D, it may be 
more desirable for the domestic government to allow domestic firms to cooperate in 
R&D. One famous example of R&D cooperation is the Microelectronics and Computer 
Technology Corporation (MCC) in the US. MCC is a private venture with more than 20 
participating firms. As Peck (1986) shows, the threat from Japanese firms and large 
domestic firms was a major reason for the formation of MCC.  With foreign R&D 
competition, the formation of MCC was not challenged by the US antitrust authorities. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper provides a unified approach to study the influence of uncertainty and 
spillovers on international R&D competition. When the reward to the winner of 
competition is exogenously given, we show that domestic government’s optimal R&D 
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policy depends on the type of uncertainty that characterizes the R&D process. The size of 
tax or subsidy depends on the degree of spillovers. When the reward to the winner is 
endogenously determined by R&D spending, the direction of optimal policy is not only 
sensitive to the type of uncertainty, but also sensitive to the degree of spillovers. In 
reality, a government may have limited information about the type of uncertainties faced 
by industries. Industries also differ in their degree of R&D spillovers. Those factors will 
limit a government’s ability to take an active role in helping its firms in R&D 
competition. 
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